Political intelligence. The meaning of "political intelligence"

Intelligence is at the heart of war itself. Knowledge of what and how the enemy intends to do remains in wartime the most valuable asset of the military and political leadership of the country. The duty of the intelligence services is to obtain this information by any means, by hook or by crook. In turn, the role of spies and agents is to reveal the enemy's disposition, intentions, strength and weakness in order to take appropriate measures and move their own troops to the best possible positions. It would be a mistake to argue, as some idealists and cynics do, that intelligence is not worth the effort and resources spent on it. It will be shown below that while this view has some merit, it can be dangerous and potentially disastrous in wartime.

Few intelligence services are surrounded by such myths and remain as poorly understood as those of Nazi Germany. The military intelligence service known as the Abwehr is hidden behind a veil of lies, falsifications and contradictory facts. This is due in no small part to one figure who towers above Germany's other espionage masters: Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who headed the Abwehr from January 1935 to March (Feb. - Ed.) 1944 An enthusiastic supporter of Hitler at the beginning of his career, he became disillusioned with Nazism during the Second World War. Trying to play the role of a faithful servant of the Fuhrer, Canaris simultaneously tried to stay within the framework of civilized behavior towards opponents and support the opposition movement, which was not particularly active, but still constantly existed. This is one of the amazing paradoxes of the Third Reich, that the organization that zealously sought to realize Hitler’s grandiose ambitions, the Wehrmacht, was at the same time the soul of the anti-Hitler opposition. Within the Wehrmacht, it was the Abwehr that was the part most opposed to Hitler’s regime and had the largest number of conspirators in its ranks. In the end, Canaris and most of the people loyal to him paid for their opposition to the Fuhrer with their own lives (Canaris was executed on April 9, 1945 in the Flossenbürg concentration camp. - Ed.).

Hitler's National Socialist Revolution did not destroy the traditional pillars of monarchical, conservative Germany after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Opposition centers, including some elements of the armed forces (until 1935 Reichswehr, from March 16, 1935 Wehrmacht) and the Abwehr, remained intact , ready to take advantage of any opportunity to weaken and undermine the Nazi regime as more and more evidence of its tyrannical nature emerges.

The Nazi domestic intelligence service in action. The man in the center, wearing a hat, is a member of the Gestapo, a state security agency

Hitler never fully trusted the military intelligence service and constantly tried, as in other areas, to be guided by the disastrous Roman maxim of “divide and rule.”

Selecting a young and ruthless intelligence officer from the ranks of the SS, he tasked him with forming his own Nazi secret service, the formidable and terrible Sicherheitsdienst, SD. This man, the most terrible and ruthless (according to the author, in fact, there are many candidates for the definition of “the very best.” – Ed.) figure of the Third Reich, was Reinhard Heydrich, who began his career in the German naval forces under the leadership of Canaris, but ultimately turned out to be the admiral's worst enemy. By the time of his death in May (June 4. – Ed.) By 1942, Heydrich may have already been plotting a blow against the Abwehr, an organization he feared and hated. Under the leadership of Heydrich, the SD became a kind of “department of dirty deeds”, carrying out any orders of Hitler, participation in which Canaris tried to avoid.

Canaris (third from right) was never part of Hitler's inner circle, and therefore always remained wary in the presence of his rival Himmler (in a black uniform and glasses on the left). The photo taken before the war also shows Joseph Goebbels (in a light jacket in the center)

The SD managed to achieve some success, although the intrigues and intrigues carried out by the SD and the Abwehr against each other had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of German intelligence. When they worked together, as against the British in Holland in 1942, they achieved impressive successes. The overall effect of this secret war between the intelligence services was disgraceful failure in many areas. Triumphant victories - of the SD and Abwehr in Holland, agent Cicero in Turkey and the intelligence organization of Colonel Gehlen on the Eastern Front - are balanced by no less significant failures in other places.

General Kurt von Schleicher (left, in uniform) and Count Franz von Papen. Both were Hitler's predecessors as Chancellor of Germany

"Hitler's Spy Machine" is first and foremost a story of betrayal, conspiracy, deceit, cowardice, double-dealing and treason, but also of heroism, intelligence, insight and composure. If intelligence warfare seems a relatively pleasant experience compared to the brutal, bloody carnage of the battlefield, then it is worth remembering that the average estimated life expectancy of an agent during World War II was extremely short. There was no pity shown to those captured, and most of the agents were sooner or later discovered by the enemy. This book is about them. This book is about a network of Nazi spies and agents who operated throughout the world and spread fear and terror throughout Europe.

Chapter 1
Intelligence Service

Espionage is the second oldest profession and, moreover, as honorable as the first.

Michael J. Barrett, Assistant Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency

The German intelligence services of World War II were created on the basis of intelligence services that existed during the Prussian and imperial eras. Thus, the intelligence department of the German General Staff (ND - from Nachrichtendienst) was a very formidable weapon long before the First World War. The possibility of German agents infiltrating the country was a serious concern for the British before 1914, and their fears were based on the reputation of the German intelligence service, which was considered - sometimes without good reason - to be omnipotent and supremely effective.

Although British fears were exaggerated, German intelligence did manage to conduct several successful intelligence operations both before and after the First World War, but they occurred against a backdrop of equally spectacular failures. The ND was the predecessor of the Abwehr, whose future chief, Admiral Canaris, was its agent.

Humble Beginnings

Germany's intelligence services have their roots in the High Command ground forces(OKH), which had a well-known General Staff of the Ground Forces, which housed the core of first the Prussian and then the German intelligence services with early XIX centuries until the disbandment of the Abwehr and OKH in 1944 (departments and other components of the Abwehr became part of the Main Directorate of Reich Security. - Ed.).

In peacetime there was no dedicated intelligence unit in the Prussian army, and General Staff officers traditionally viewed the value of intelligence with distrust. However, the great German commander, General Count Helmuth von Moltke, did not share any doubts about the need for military espionage. He made extensive use of the services of spies in the 1866 war against Austria and demanded that the intelligence department recruit an agent capable of finding out the details of the disposition of the Austrian troops. Such an agent was a young Austrian officer who retired in 1863 and gained access to the Austrian General Staff as a journalist. In April 1866, this agent, Baron August von Schluga, came to Berlin with a complete plan of the combat disposition of the Austrian army, a dossier on the commanders of the troops and the war plans of the Austrians. Moltke defeated the enemy in a brilliant campaign, culminating in the legendary Battle of Königgrätz in July of that year, which finally sealed the Prussian victory. (Battle of Königgrätz (modern Hradec Kralove) July 3, 1866 in our historical literature usually called the Battle of Sadovo (a town 14 kilometers from Hradec Kralove). The Austro-Saxon army of General L. Benedek (215 thousand, 770 guns) was defeated, losing 1,313 officers and 41,499 lower ranks killed, wounded and missing (including up to 20 thousand prisoners). The victorious Prussians lost 360 officers and 8,812 lower ranks. The decisive role in the victory of the Prussians was played by the superiority of their small arms (needle guns) and rifled breech-loading Krupp guns (which fired at 3.5 kilometers versus 2 kilometers for rifled guns loaded from the muzzle of Austrian cannons). – Ed.)

General Count Helmuth von Moltke, the great Prussian tactician and strategist, who owed his victory over Austria in 1866 to good intelligence, especially the work of Agent No. 17

Moltke owed his success to a large extent to Schluge, who remained in the service of Prussia and later the Empire as Agent No. 17. The decision taken at the same time to make the intelligence department a permanent section of the OKH was, however, put into practice only in 1889. Subsequent service was called department IIIb, but was better known as Nachrichtendienst (ND).

Prior to this reorganization, the service was divided, and German military intelligence remained divided into two large sections. Their existence reflected a vulnerable geographical location countries, the presence of potential adversaries and the need to plan for a war on two fronts - problems that plagued Germany in both world wars. One section was tasked with monitoring the situation in the West (primarily in France), the other in the East (exclusively in Russia).

Colonel Nikolai's Intelligence Service

Having defeated Napoleon III's France in 1871 (Napoleon III was captured by Prussia at Sedan on September 2, 1870, after which a revolution broke out in Paris on September 4, and France ended the war as a republic. - Ed.), Prussia paved the way for the unification of all of Germany under its auspices and the dominant influence on European politics of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. For the next three decades, Europe lived in peace. In 1890, Bismarck was dismissed and the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, replaced him with an army of bureaucrats, and military intelligence suffered as a result. Section III mothballed its main agent in France, No. 17. Neither he himself nor his controllers in Berlin knew that the need for his services would arise only forty years later. He continued to send reports to Berlin, but did not participate in active espionage work and, for security reasons, met with his controller only once a year. ND had no idea whether Shluga lived in Paris or whether he was alive at all.

In 1894, France entered into a formal alliance with Imperial Russia, which created fears in Germany of being surrounded. This fear and sense of insecurity had a beneficial effect on the military intelligence department, as the expanded department III became the largest military intelligence service outside Russia. Special intelligence officers were stationed in cities located near the western and eastern borders. In the west, such cities were Münster, Koblenz, Metz, Saarbrücken, Karlsruhe and Strasbourg - from here France was closely monitored. In the east - against Russia - intelligence posts were located in Königsberg, Allenstein, Danzig, Poznan and Breslau, from where espionage activities were carried out on the territory of the Russian part of Poland (the so-called Privislensky region, as the Kingdom of Poland was called in official documents of the tsarist government from 1888. - Ed.) and other western provinces of Russia.

Sent to spy on France and Russia, the officers acted almost alone - they were not supposed to have any auxiliary staff. Since the General Staff was constantly experiencing a lack of funds, money was reluctantly allocated to spies and agents to conduct intelligence work on the territory of a potential enemy. The aggravation of the international situation in the late 1890s forced the tight-fisted German General Staff to finance the expansion of the intelligence service. By 1901 it included a large central staff based in Berlin, intelligence officers on the borders and 124 paid agents working in Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and Romania. The presence of such an impressive intelligence network allowed Germany to count on early warning of the enemy's preparations for war, including access to mobilization plans.

However, the influence of these professionals should not be exaggerated, since most of the work was still carried out by German military attaches who were part of the embassies and diplomatic missions scattered across Europe. France turned out to be the toughest nut to crack in terms of collecting information, since the French, both in peacetime and in wartime, saw Germany as their main enemy. German officers, including the military attaché in Paris, were prohibited, under threat of expulsion, from attending French army maneuvers, which was at that time a legal and generally accepted method of collecting military intelligence. The French prohibitive measures forced the military attache, Major Max von Schwarzkoppen, to turn to espionage, exposing himself and the embassy to the danger of exposure and diplomatic scandal.

The strengthening of Britain's naval power attracted the close attention of the military intelligence department only in 1901, when, by mutual agreement, naval attaches were appointed to London and Berlin. This allowed the German naval attaché to begin collecting information on the British navy. Until then, the main sources of information about the powerful enemy were the documents of the British Parliament, reports of debates in the House of Commons and the free British press. Six naval officers in Berlin were engaged in collecting, sorting and analyzing the flow of incoming information. In 1903, the German Admiralty proposed that the intelligence service assign one naval officer to all the main ports of Britain to conduct espionage work and compile detailed reports for the German naval attache in London. This step led to increased tension in Anglo-German relations and caused a wave of spy mania, first in Britain and then in Germany, a wave that swept through both countries and gave rise to suspicion and paranoia.

One of Krupp's large-caliber siege weapons. The intelligence service managed to conceal the existence of these guns from the French and Russians until the outbreak of the First World War

In 1908, the German army leadership still had the position that effective information gathering could be done by field officers, and reconnaissance should be concentrated exclusively in the hands of army cavalry units. This kind of anachronistic ideas about the tasks and methods of reconnaissance prevailed in all European armies before the First World War. Nevertheless, the ND continued to expand and by that time had transformed into the following departments: department 1 (Russia), department 3 (France and Belgium), department 9 (Italy), department 10 (Austria-Hungary), department 4 (foreign fortresses) and , finally, the “Cinderella” of the intelligence service, department 7 (technical development).

Nikolai and departments 1 and 3

Then, as later, Russia posed a serious problem for Germany from an intelligence point of view. The Russian state had at its disposal the most effective and formidable internal security service, the so-called “okhrana”, “security department” (Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order - a secret police agency in Tsarist Russia, in charge of political investigation. Security departments were subordinate to the police department and were established under governors, mayors and chief police officers. The first security departments were created in 1881 in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw. – Ed.), which not only successfully pursued and destroyed revolutionary terrorists, but also caught foreign spies. The Russians, due to their experience and professionalism in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence, took security issues very carefully and seriously. For example, the State Duma (1906–1917), which was not known for its prudence on many issues, never held open debates on defense issues, which was a normal procedure for the British Parliament. The officers of Section 1 had to look through newspapers to find reports on the consideration of military issues. Fortunately for the Germans, their military attache in St. Petersburg, Captain Bernhard von Eggeling, was a competent man, attentive to intelligence requests and a vigilant observer of the state of affairs in the military field. As a result, the intelligence service did not rate the Russian army very highly and considered it slow, clumsy, and pursuing a defensive strategy rather than an offensive one.

A new battlecruiser launched (still without deck superstructures and weapons) before the start of the First World War. Germany's determination to build a powerful high seas fleet has heightened tensions between London and Berlin

In the pre-war period, the head of Department 1 for a long time was Colonel Walter Nicolai, who spoke fluent French, Russian and Japanese, which was a significant achievement for an officer in the German army, in which even a superficial command of French was considered “knowledge of the language.” While training at the academy (1901–1903), Nikolai went on a spy mission to Poland, where he studied the defensive and mobilization capabilities of the Russians and specified the location of the border fortresses of Novo-Georgievsk (modern Modlin), Grodno, Kovno (modern Kaunas) and Warsaw. Upon returning to Germany, Nikolai submitted a report to the General Staff, which, impressed by the work done by the young officer, promoted him to the rank of major and appointed him head of department 1. Despite the scale of the tasks, Nikolai had a meager budget of 15 thousand pounds sterling and staff of four officers. And these people stood up to Germany's greatest enemy. The Russian threat grew day by day before the eyes of concerned observers in Berlin, forcing the intelligence service to revise its unflattering assessments of the state of the imperial army. (Russian military doctrine, unlike the aggressive German one, was defensive. - Ed.) The population of its eastern neighbor was twice the population of Germany, indicators industrial production exceeded similar indicators of the United States of America (absolute production indicators in the USA were much higher, but the development dynamics and especially the prospects for Russia were very good. – Ed.), and mobilization capabilities have increased since 1905 so much that the advanced formations of the Russian army could be assembled and ready to move into position on the fifth day after receiving the order. At the same time, the border lines with Germany were strengthened, which became possible thanks to France, which allocated 1.2–1.5 billion francs to the eastern colossus for the construction, modernization and expansion of the Russian railway system. In connection with these measures, the danger to the Germans increased, since the Russians could now transfer six more divisions from Siberia to their western front. This development of events increased the risk for Germany of a prolonged war on two fronts.

The Avenger Strikes

Colonel Nicolai had no doubt that the Russian and French intelligence services were working closely together against Germany and that the French Deuxieme Bureau(Bureau 2 of the General Staff, or military intelligence) has spies in the German army. Nicolai assumed that these spies had already given France details of the Schlieffen Plan, which envisaged achieving victory in a war on two fronts. In fact, copies of the Schlieffen plan were obtained by the Russian secret police in collaboration with military intelligence. Already before the start of the war, a French intelligence officer, Captain Lambling, met three times with a certain German who worked for the Russians and called himself Le Vengeur (The Avenger). Meeting with Lambling in Paris, Brussels and Nice, the Avenger chose secluded places, where he appeared with a bandaged face. However, whatever the captain thought about this masquerade, the Avenger conveyed to him not only the entire Schlieffen plan, but also the details of the deployment, concentration and order of battle of the German army. Lambling assessed the information received as quite reliable, which was confirmed by checking it through other sources.

All the information received from the German was sent to Paris, where the General Staff of the French Army, which had a reputation as a team of brilliant analysts and strategists, rejected Schlieffen's plan as unrealistic, considering the Avenger a decoy. The very fact of non-acceptance of the most valuable fruits of intelligence allows us to draw several important conclusions. First, he points to the general inability of all military personnel to use the information provided to them by intelligence services, and their skepticism towards information that seems dubious to them precisely because of its importance. Secondly, the case of the Schlieffen Plan clearly demonstrates the unfortunate French tradition of relying on the experience of the past in strategic planning. During the war of 1870–1871. The Germans, respecting Belgium's neutrality, invaded France through Alsace and Lorraine. For some reason, the French high command decided that Germany would repeat the same scenario in a future war. Based on this assumption, the French created an impressive defensive line from the Belgian to the Swiss border, placing all their advanced forces here and developing plan 17, providing for its own offensive as a response to any German invasion.

91 years ago, on December 20, 1920, Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky signed order No. 169 on the creation of the Foreign Department of the Cheka (INO). The decision was dictated by the ending civil war and the formation of centers of white emigration in the countries of central Europe and the Balkans. Intelligence was withdrawn from the Special Department of the Cheka and became an independent unit.

The INO VChK was then given only two main tasks:

1. obtaining information about the subversive activities of counter-revolutionary White Guard organizations abroad and their agents sent to our country;
2. obtaining secret documentary information that is of utmost importance for ensuring the security of the state.

In June 1922, the Regulations on the Trans-Cordon Department of the INO GPU were approved. According to this document, the Trans-Cordon Department was “an organizational center that concentrates all leadership and management of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work.”

In 1923, in accordance with the regulations on the OGPU, the Foreign Department (INO) became part of the Secret Operational Directorate of the OGPU. INO OGPU was significantly expanded. At the head of the overseas intelligence apparatus was a resident of the INO OGPU. In accordance with the resident regulations, he was given the right to independently, without a request from the Center, recruit agents. To communicate with the Center, the resident used his own code. Once every three months, the resident reported to the Center on the expenditure of foreign currency funds.

From 1922 to 1930, the head of the INO was M.A. Trilisser, who was also the head of the overseas department. In 1922, only 70 people worked at the INO OGPU. To conduct intelligence work abroad, INO residencies were created, which already in 1921-1925 covered all European countries, the USA and the Far East.

In those years, the INO OGPU created a system of “legal” residencies. The residencies were few in number and consisted, as a rule, of 2-4 people. They acted, as a rule, under the cover of Soviet diplomatic or trade missions.

In the 1920s, the White Guard emigration was considered the main enemy and object of “close attention” of Soviet foreign intelligence. She openly and demonstratively declared her desire to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks. The “demonstration” of the defeated enemies frightened the Soviet leadership to such an extent that the “primary task” of foreign intelligence was determined to be the activity of penetrating the White émigré organizations and identifying their plans, tasks, composition and (most importantly!) sources of funding.

In 1921-23, the overseas intelligence of the OGPU managed to ensure agent penetration into such active white émigré formations as Savinkov’s “People’s Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom” and the “Russian All-Military Union” (ROVS).

Already in January 1923, Y. Kh. Davtyan sent to the Center all the White Guard counterintelligence archives obtained by INO agents in Harbin.

The most important results of activities along the White emigrant line in 1921-1925 were Operation Syndicate-2 to bring B. Savinkov to the USSR and Operation Trust against the British agent S. Reilly, which affected the widest strata of the emigration. Active attempts were made to attract INO to their side, or “recruit” as former leaders white movement, and representatives of “Eurasian” movements. There was active propaganda among the “moderate” wing of the emigration and the “left” emigration.

At the end of the 20s, the USSR actually abandoned the NEP policy proclaimed by V.I. Lenin. A course was set for accelerated industrialization of the country, and in the field of agriculture - for collectivization. The excesses committed by the Stalinist leadership in pursuing this course led to a worsening of the internal situation in the country and an increase in contradictions between the city and the countryside. This did not go unnoticed by the external environment of the USSR. The white emigration, having already spent almost all their strength and resources fighting life in a foreign land, again found hope for the restoration of the previous order in Russia. International isolation has increased Soviet Union. In 1927, Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. Political relations with France were practically frozen.

On January 30, 1930, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fearing a new intervention, decided to reorganize foreign intelligence. It is tasked with intensifying intelligence work in England, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Japan, the Baltic countries and Finland. Particular attention was paid to organizing intelligence work from illegal positions. Illegal residencies have now been created in almost all European countries, in the USA, Turkey and China. In Berlin, the residency remained “legal.” For ten years, it was the leading foreign intelligence unit not only for Germany, but also for neighboring European countries, the Near and Middle East.

As we see, by the 1930s, the tasks and goals of foreign intelligence expanded significantly. Nevertheless, even in the conditions of a changed political situation, one of the main tasks of the INO OGPU remained the fight against anti-Soviet emigration and its “terrorist” organizations. One can only guess what was meant by “its terrorist organizations” in those years. After the “Trust” and the “Syndicates”, in the isolated environment of emigration there was not a single force left capable of carrying out any real work against the USSR.

In the late 20s - early 30s (with the help of the Soviet intelligence services), almost all the main leaders of the former “white” armies went into oblivion. In 1928, under unclear circumstances, P.N. died suddenly. Wrangel. In 1930, Soviet intelligence kidnapped the head of the ROVSoyuz, the last “terrorist,” General Kutepov, in Paris. Evil rumors spread by Soviet agents immediately spread about his disappearance. The “left-wing” emigre press openly spoke about Kutepov’s conversion by the Soviets, about the “double game” that the chairman of the EMRO allegedly played in recent years. This slander, aimed at “decomposing” and demoralizing military emigrants, was believed by many ordinary and non-ordinary members of officer organizations in France and other European countries.

The “activist” activity of the military emigration is practically dying out. General Miller, who replaced Kutepov as chairman of the EMRO, had no thoughts of resuming underground terrorist work in Russia. The white emigrant generals, out of old habit, were too careless even about their own security system. They not only could not compete with Soviet intelligence, but they frankly did not want to, considering such “work” to be inconsistent with the concept of officer honor.

For example, in response to a request (not an order!) E.K. Miller to “continue the work of Kutepov” in Russia, the head of the 2nd department of the EMRO (Berlin), Major General von Lampe, stated: “I have never been a terrorist, I have not been involved in conspiracy and I don’t want to “learn” this” [GARF. F.5853.Op.1. D.40.L.31.].

His opinion was fully shared by other members of the ROVSoyuz, who were not recruited by Soviet intelligence.

By the mid-30s, the “decomposition” of white emigration had reached its limit. Even those people who were considered “beyond suspicion” entered into collusion with the Soviet intelligence services. In the notorious kidnapping of General Miller in 1938, two pioneer officers were involved. Participants in the first Kuban campaigns of the Volunteer Army were called “pioneers.” Together with generals Kornilov, Denikin and Markov, they were the first to serve the ideals of the white movement and continued to enjoy great respect among the white military emigration.

However, the “pioneer” General Skoblin, the husband of the singer Plevitskaya, organized the kidnapping of the elderly head of the EMRO E.K. Miller, and the former Markovite officer and husband of the poet M. Tsvetaeva Sergei Efron took an active part in it. They both managed to escape to the USSR. Only Plevitskaya was put on trial in France. Efron was shot in Moscow in 1941. The fate of his family taken to the USSR was no less tragic.

At the end of the 30s, the leadership of the party and the country did not bother to remove the “main” task assigned to the INO VChK F.E. Dzerzhinsky back in 1920. The intelligence officers continued to actively “disintegrate” the already thinned ranks of the EMRO, recruiting agents who, after being transported to the USSR, were simply allowed to be “consumed” - as unnecessary.

In this article we deliberately do not touch upon the activities of the Soviet military intelligence. INO VChK as a body political intelligence, was built in contrast to the one that already existed since the Civil War military intelligence, created by order of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 197/27 of November 5, 1918. Thus, these two branches of Soviet foreign intelligence, being organizationally independent, constantly competed, mutually complementing each other. This intelligence rivalry allowed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to completely control their activities.

On the eve of World War II, the role of political intelligence was no less important than the role of military intelligence, however, as if by the inertia of the 20s, it continued to engage in the extermination of long-powerless emigration leaders, instead of spending energy and money on more constructive things needed Soviet country.

Counterintelligence Dictionary

Political intelligence

1) type of intelligence activity, the object of which is the enemy’s political forces, means, plans and secrets, as well as his unprotected information of a domestic and foreign policy nature. In addition, the purpose of political intelligence is to undermine the moral and political potential of the enemy. Political intelligence of imperialist states is primarily directed against the main revolutionary forces of our time - socialist countries, the world labor movement, and the people's liberation struggle. At the same time, political intelligence is also used in the internecine struggle of capitalist states. However, here it does not acquire such a comprehensive, total character as in the fight against the main revolutionary forces of our time.

Depending on who (domestic or foreign policy opponents) political intelligence is directed against, it is divided into domestic political intelligence (political investigation) and foreign policy intelligence. Political intelligence is usually carried out by various intelligence services, specializing either in domestic political or foreign policy intelligence, but sometimes these functions are performed by one body (for example, in Nazi Germany - RSHA);

2) Political intelligence in the narrow sense is one of the types of foreign intelligence, existing along with military, economic and scientific-technical intelligence. In this sense, it coincides with the concept of foreign policy intelligence. In modern conditions, there has been a significant increase in the share of political intelligence in the overall system of types of intelligence and information activities of imperialist states against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This process is due to changes in the political strategy of imperialism.

If so many senior officials believe that intelligence should not perform the functions of warning and assessing events, that is, to engage in what, in the general opinion, is precisely its direct responsibility, then it is not surprising that there are even more objections and in more decisive forms meets every proposal about the need to bring intelligence closer to politics - to give intelligence the right to study the various opportunities opening up to US policy in certain areas, and to evaluate the correctness of the principles on which the pursued policy is based.

When asked by the author how intelligence can help a statesman assess the likely consequences of pursuing a particular policy course possible for the United States at the present time, one of the responsible officials replied that such a figure, instructing intelligence to study this kind of issue, is practically avoiding fulfilling his duties. direct responsibilities. A statesman, he said, is obliged to make a decision even if he does not have all the facts necessary for this. It is the business of the State Department to see that it is fully supplied with such facts; This is what intelligence agencies are for. Intelligence, he firmly stated, must provide information; nothing more is required of it.

Another official also emphasized that, in his opinion, such functions go beyond the scope of intelligence activities. The business of intelligence is to collect and group facts, and then weigh them and generalize them. If intelligence can pull this off, it will do something useful: it will enable other State Department agencies to check the accuracy of their own work. As for solving certain problems, this is a matter for government officials who have a great deal of power for this. practical experience.

Once discussing with one responsible official a review of Far East, I asked what his opinion was on the findings of this review. “About conclusions?” he asked, irritably emphasizing this word, and replied that conclusions were not the business of intelligence. The intelligence officer must ensure that his review uses all the facts available to him. He must provide the necessary material - that is all that is required of him. During the argument, this official agreed that in many cases an intelligence officer cannot help but draw some conclusions, but at the same time he emphasized the danger of an intelligence officer moving away from facts and reality. Intelligence agents tend to build castles in the air, and therefore their conclusions must be carefully checked by those who deal with the problems of a given country on a daily basis. Of course, he said, we are interested in both “prospective” problems and problems of immediate “practice”. Both are important. The only danger is to put too much emphasis on one thing at the expense of the other. There are many areas, he concluded, in which intelligence could work successfully, for example, it could determine how effective the Voice of America's broadcasts are. Intelligence officers should collect materials such as feedback on the work of the Voice of America that are of interest to political leaders.

Similar arguments are repeated whenever statesmen and decision-makers are forced to justify their views on the role of intelligence. Above all, they emphasize the importance of having all the facts. They are afraid that a person involved in politics and solving some problem will unreasonably defend his own decisions. They feel that if the same person is also engaged in collecting facts on the problem of interest to him, he will tend to select facts that confirm his point of view, and therefore will not be able to correctly solve this problem. It should also be borne in mind that information service workers are usually treated with distrust. Since this almost does not apply to economists and, obviously, not at all to natural scientists, this distrust can be explained to some extent only by insufficient development social sciences. In any case, to a high-ranking official in the State Department, who feels like a student of a famous magician, faced with the need to quickly solve the problems that arise before him, the informant appears to be some kind of dreamer, a man who spends his whole life poring over dusty books in the gloomy halls of libraries, fenced off from the real world. life. At the same time, statesmen tend to believe that the only source of true knowledge and correct judgment needed to solve problems that arise in the real world, in the thick of life, is most likely to be practical experience rather than academic training in an educational institution.

Apparently, they are convinced that practical experience develops the ability to “feel” a problem, the talent for accurate premonition, and that only such a “sixth sense” can help eliminate all doubts when solving the most complex problems foreign policy and find the most effective course of action.

These views were summed up clearly and convincingly by one of the senior figures, a man of high intelligence and great talent, manifested in the ability to penetrate deeply into the essence of problems and express his thoughts clearly and intelligibly. He said that the view that justifies the current division of activities is based on the idea that only an independent intelligence agency can be objective. Intelligence officers cannot have any other purpose other than presenting the facts in their pure form. Almost everyone probably has their own political views, especially in the US, where professional politicians24 are not trusted. However, he is convinced of the correctness of the concept that information is more objective when the person collecting it does not decide political issues. According to him, the study of the various possibilities opening up to politics is a political function; If an intelligence officer becomes involved in political issues, he will not be able to be objective.

Allowing statesmen and intelligence officers to explore these possibilities, he continued, would also be a mistake. If intelligence has the best people, you can change the signs on the doors of their offices and make these people responsible leaders. But if you combine both of these functions, you end the very idea of ​​intelligence. And a completely different question: should intelligence be centralized or decentralized?

He further said that the most important thing for a politician is experience. Every capable specialist or scientist knows how to analyze. However, it is one thing to analyze the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, and quite another to assess modern events. When analyzing foreign policy facts that require decision-making, no amount of scientific training will help; experience is needed here. George Kennan, for example, has a better grasp of the meaning of current events than any member of the intelligence community. What is the difference between them? And the difference is that one is used to dealing only with real life, and the other is with libraries. Continuing, this leader stated that he would prefer, if necessary, to go under the knife of a country doctor, than to deal with one of those brilliant medical scientists who know nothing except the laboratory and books. We need professional politicians more than experts and scientists. That's why the State Department prepares professional politicians, giving them the opportunity to gain experience and relevant training. If he had to choose between an experienced historian and a professional politician with experience practical work, he would have chosen the second one. When all the facts are laid out on the table, he said, the responsible official's "sixth sense" will tell him which one is in charge. Such a worker seems to have a kind of antenna (at the same time, my interlocutor put the back of his hand to his forehead and moved his fingers), which lets him know when she accepts the correct facts. This ability comes from experience. To develop it, you need to swim around and around a lot!

To the question, why keep people who have nothing to do with resolving political issues to collect facts, when only responsible officials can give a final assessment of the facts, the answer was that they could be wrong, although in general a responsible official will always assess the fact more correctly, than an intelligence officer. Therefore, someone must collect information so that the responsible official has all the facts before him. Then he can say: “This is, of course, a fact, but it does not deserve attention. But this is a very important fact.” But the responsible official should not collect information himself, since he may miss some important fact or simply ignore it.

When the author, having thanked his interlocutor, was about to leave, the latter detained him and gave another example to confirm what he had said. He said that some time ago he had to draw up a memo regarding intelligence problems. In this memo, he recommended that intelligence information should not be called assessed information, but simply information. The fact is, he said, that by accepting the first definition, we admit the possibility of an insufficiently objective assessment of the facts, since we are moving away from our basis - unvarnished facts.

1) type of intelligence activity, the object of which is the enemy’s political forces, means, plans and secrets, as well as his unprotected information of a domestic and foreign policy nature. In addition, the purpose of political intelligence is to undermine the moral and political potential of the enemy. Political intelligence of imperialist states is primarily directed against the main revolutionary forces of our time - socialist countries, the world labor movement, and the people's liberation struggle. At the same time, political intelligence is also used in the internecine struggle of capitalist states. However, here it does not acquire such a comprehensive, total character as in the fight against the main revolutionary forces of our time.

Depending on who (domestic or foreign policy opponents) political intelligence is directed against, it is divided into domestic political intelligence (political investigation) and foreign policy intelligence. Political intelligence is usually carried out by various intelligence services, specializing either in domestic political or foreign policy intelligence, but sometimes these functions are performed by one body (for example, in Nazi Germany - RSHA);

2) Political intelligence in the narrow sense is one of the types of foreign intelligence, existing along with military, economic and scientific-technical intelligence. In this sense, it coincides with the concept of foreign policy intelligence. In modern conditions, there has been a significant increase in the share of political intelligence in the overall system of types of intelligence and information activities of imperialist states against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This process is due to changes in the political strategy of imperialism.

• - 1) a system of state bodies endowed with special competence in the field of obtaining, processing and analyzing various intelligence information, as well as carrying out other subversive activities in the interests of...

  Counterintelligence Dictionary

• - and. 1. A set of geological works carried out to find gold and determine the geological and industrial parameters of the deposit. - I’ll start with reconnaissance of the area as the most important thing in gold mining...

  Dictionary of gold mining Russian Empire

• - complex geol. work carried out to determine a number of geological and industrial parameters that comprehensively characterize the deposit and are necessary for its industrial assessment, design and construction...

  Geological encyclopedia

• - obtaining information about the situation and the enemy. According to its purpose, missile defense is divided into operational and tactical...

  Marine dictionary

• - a set of activities of the military command of all levels, carried out with the aim of collecting data on the state, actions and intentions of enemy troops, on the terrain, radiation, chemical conditions, etc....

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

• - in military affairs - a set of activities for the purpose of collecting data about the current or potential enemy, terrain and...

  Large encyclopedic dictionary

• - Formed in a suffixal way from the verb razvadati - “to find out”, formed in turn in a prefix way from vadati - “to know”...

  Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language by Krylov

• - INTELLIGENCE, -and, female. 1. Examination of something. for a special purpose. R. mineral deposits. R. for oil. R. fish from a helicopter. 2...

  Dictionary Ozhegova

• - INTELLIGENCE, intelligence, women. 1. units only Action under Ch. scout in 2 digits - to scout. Go on reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance of the area occupied by the enemy. Oil exploration...

  Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

• - political outdated...

  Explanatory Dictionary by Efremova

• - reconnaissance 1. process of action according to ch. to scout 2., to scout 2. The result of such an action...

  Explanatory Dictionary by Efremova

• - un"...

  Russian spelling dictionary

• - Original. Suf. derivative from reconnoiter “to find out”, pref. education from knowing “to know”. See know, news...

  Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language

• - Reconnaissance in force. Publ. Trying to figure out something. as a result of direct actions. NSZ-70; Mokienko 2003, 93. You can’t go on reconnaissance missions with anyone. Razg. Disapproved About an unreliable person. Mokienko 2003, 94...

  Large dictionary of Russian sayings

• - INTELLIGENCE, -i, w. Going out shopping. I'll go explore. Mother went on reconnaissance mission to get some beef tongue...

  Dictionary of Russian argot

• - ...

  Word forms

"Political intelligence" in books

Intelligence

Reconnaissance Wander around, slide off rocks, look for signs in streams, for which metal is famous, covered in stone. In the taiga, digging up a treasure, Scrape with a persistent shovel, Search by touch, at random for signs of a rich placer. And drill holes into the valleys. And tear your shirt

Intelligence is not an art, intelligence is a craft