Three directions of movement of German troops. Plan Barbarossa

When developing a large-scale secret military operation, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa,” the General Staff of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler personally set the main goal of defeating the army of the Soviet Union and capturing Moscow as quickly as possible. It was planned that Operation Barbarossa should be successfully completed even before the onset of severe Russian frosts and be fully implemented in 2-2.5 months. But this ambitious plan was not destined to come true. On the contrary, it led to the complete collapse of Nazi Germany and dramatic geopolitical changes throughout the world.

Classmates

Prerequisites for the emergence

Despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, Hitler continued to hatch plans to seize the “eastern lands,” by which he meant the western half of the Soviet Union. This was a necessary means of achieving world domination and eliminating a strong competitor from the world map. Which, in turn, gave him a free hand in the fight against the USA and Great Britain.

The following circumstances allowed Hitler’s General Staff to hope for a quick conquest of the Russians:

  • powerful German war machine;
  • rich combat experience gained in the European theater of operations;
  • advanced weapons technology and impeccable discipline among the troops.

Since powerful France and strong Poland very quickly fell under the blows of the steel German fist, Hitler was confident that the attack on the territory of the Soviet Union would also bring rapid success. Moreover, the constantly conducted in-depth multi-echelon reconnaissance at almost all levels showed that the USSR was significantly losing in the most important military aspects:

  • quality of weapons, equipment and equipment;
  • capabilities for strategic and operational-tactical command and control of troops and reserves;
  • supply and logistics.

In addition, the German militarists also counted on a kind of “fifth column” - people dissatisfied with the Soviet regime, nationalists of various kinds, traitors, and so on. Another argument in favor of a speedy attack on the USSR was the long process of rearmament carried out at that time in the Red Army. Well-known repressions also played a role in Hitler’s decision, practically decapitating the top and middle command staff of the Red Army. So, Germany had all the prerequisites for developing a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Plan Description

The essence

As Wikipedia quite rightly points out, the development of a large-scale operation to attack the Land of the Soviets began in 1940, in July. The main emphasis was placed on strength, speed and the effect of surprise. Using the massive use of aviation, tank and mechanized formations, it was planned to defeat and destroy the main backbone of the Russian army, then concentrated on the territory of Belarus.

Having defeated the border garrisons, high-speed tank wedges were supposed to systematically envelop, encircle and destroy large units and formations of Soviet troops, and then quickly move on according to the approved plan. Regular infantry units were supposed to finish off the remaining scattered groups that had not stopped resisting.

In order to gain undeniable air supremacy in the very first hours of the war, it was planned to destroy Soviet aircraft on the ground before they had time to take off due to confusion. Large fortified areas and garrisons offering resistance to advanced assault groups and divisions were simply to be bypassed, continuing rapid advance.

The German command was somewhat constrained in choosing the direction of attacks, since the network of high-quality roads in the USSR was poorly developed, and the railway infrastructure, due to the difference in standards, had to undergo a certain modernization in order for the Germans to use it. As a result, the choice was made on the following main general directions (of course, with the possibility of certain adjustments):

  • northern, whose task was to attack from East Prussia through the Baltic states to Leningrad;
  • central (the main and most powerful), designed to advance through Belarus to Moscow;
  • southern, whose tasks included the capture of Right Bank Ukraine and further advancement towards the oil-rich Caucasus.

The initial implementation deadline was March 1941, with the end of the spring thaw in Russia. That's what the Barbarossa plan was in a nutshell. It was finally approved at the highest level on December 18, 1940 and went down in history under the name “Directive of the Supreme High Command No. 21.”

Preparation and implementation

Preparations for the attack began almost immediately. In addition to the gradual and well-disguised movement of a huge mass of troops to the common border between Germany and the USSR formed after the partition of Poland, it included many other steps and actions:

  • constant disinformation about supposedly ongoing exercises, maneuvers, redeployments, and so on;
  • diplomatic maneuvers in order to convince the top leadership of the USSR of the most peaceful and friendly intentions;
  • the transfer to the territory of the Soviet Union, in addition to an additional army of spies and intelligence officers, sabotage groups.

All these and many other various events led to the attack being postponed several times. By May 1941, a group of troops incredible in number and power, unprecedented in the entire history of the world, had accumulated on the border with the Soviet Union. Its total number exceeded 4 million people (although Wikipedia indicates a figure twice as large). On June 22, Operation Barbarossa actually began. In connection with the postponement of the start of full-scale military operations, the deadline for completing the operation was set for November, and the capture of Moscow was supposed to occur no later than the end of August.

It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines

The plan initially conceived by the German commanders-in-chief was implemented quite successfully. Superiority in the quality of equipment and weapons, advanced tactics and the notorious effect of surprise worked. The speed of the troops' advance, with rare exceptions, corresponded to the planned schedule and proceeded at the “Blitzkrieg” (lightning war) pace familiar to the Germans and discouraging the enemy.

However, very soon Operation Barbarossa began to noticeably slip and experience serious failures. Added to the fierce resistance of the Soviet army were unfamiliar difficult terrain, supply difficulties, partisan actions, muddy roads, impenetrable forests, exhaustion of forward units and formations that were constantly attacked and ambushed, as well as many other very diverse factors and reasons.

Almost after 2 months of hostilities, it became clear to most representatives of the German generals (and then to Hitler himself) that the Barbarossa plan was untenable. A brilliant operation, developed by armchair generals, ran into a cruel reality. And although the Germans tried to revive this plan, making various changes and amendments, by November 1941 it was almost completely abandoned.

The Germans actually reached Moscow, but in order to take it, they had neither the strength, nor the energy, nor the resources. Although Leningrad was under siege, it was not possible to bomb it or starve the inhabitants to death. In the south, German troops were bogged down in the endless steppes. As a result, the German army switched to winter defense, pinning its hopes on the summer campaign of 1942. As you know, instead of the “blitzkrieg” on which the “Barbarossa” plan was based, the Germans received a long, exhausting 4-year war, which ended in their complete defeat, a disaster for the country and almost a complete redrawing of the world map...

Main reasons for failure

Among other things, the reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan also lie in the arrogance and pompousness of the German generals and the Fuhrer himself. After a series of victories, they, like the entire army, believed in their own invincibility, which led to the complete fiasco of Nazi Germany.

An interesting fact: the medieval German king and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, after whom the operation to rapidly capture the USSR was named, became famous for his military exploits, but simply drowned in a river during one of the Crusades.

If Hitler and his inner circle knew even a little history, they would have once again thought about whether such a fateful campaign should be named after “Red Beard.” As a result, they all repeated the deplorable fate of the legendary character.

However, mysticism has nothing to do with it, of course. Answering the question, what are the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan, it is necessary to highlight the following points:

And this is not a complete list of reasons that led to the absolute failure of the operation.

The Barbarossa plan, conceived as another victorious blitzkrieg with the goal of expanding “living space for the Germans,” turned into a fatal disaster for them. The Germans were unable to derive any benefit for themselves from this adventure, bringing death, grief and suffering to a huge number of peoples, including themselves. It was after the failure of the Blitzkrieg that a wormhole of doubt about the imminent victory and the success of the campaign in general crept into the minds of some representatives of the German generals. However, real panic and moral decay of the German army and its leadership were still far away...

The fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, called the “Barbarossa Plan” after the Roman emperor, was a fleeting military campaign pursuing one single goal: to defeat and destroy the USSR. The final date for the end of hostilities was supposed to be the fall of 1941.

A year before in December 1941, late in the evening the Fuhrer signed directive number 21. It was printed in nine copies and was kept in the strictest confidence.

The directive received a code name - Plan Barbarossa. It provided for the completion of the campaign to defeat the USSR even before the end of the war against Great Britain.

What was this document and what goals did Plan Barbarossa pursue? It was a carefully designed aggression directed against the Soviet Union. With its help, Hitler, intending to achieve world domination, had to remove one of the main obstacles to his imperial goals.

The main strategic objects were Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Central Industrial Region. At the same time, the capital was given a special place; its capture was considered decisive for the victorious outcome of this war.

To destroy the USSR, Hitler planned to use all German ground forces, with the exception of only those that were supposed to remain in the occupied territories.

The Barbarossa plan provided for the release of the forces of the fascist air force to assist the ground forces of this eastern operation, so that the ground part of the campaign could be completed as quickly as possible. At the same time, the directive ordered to minimize the destruction of eastern Germany by enemy aircraft by any means.

Naval combat operations against the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Soviet fleets were to be carried out by ships of the Reich Navy together with the naval forces of Romania and Finland.

For a lightning attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan considered the participation of 152 divisions, including tank and motorized divisions, and two brigades. Romania and Finland intended to field 16 brigades and 29 ground divisions in this campaign.

The armed forces of the Reich's satellite countries were to operate under a single German command. Finland's task was to cover the northern troops, which were to attack from Norwegian territory, as well as to destroy Soviet troops on the Hanko Peninsula. At the same time, Romania was supposed to tie up the actions of the Soviet troops, helping the Germans from the rear areas.

The Barbarossa plan set certain goals, which were based on pronounced class contradictions. This was the idea of ​​​​starting a war, which turned into the destruction of entire nations with the unlimited use of methods of violence.

Unlike the military invasions of France, Poland and the Balkans, the blitz campaign against the Soviet Union was prepared very carefully. Hitler's leadership spent enough time and effort to develop the Barbarossa plan, so defeat was ruled out.

But the creators were unable to accurately assess the strength and strength of the Soviet state and, based on the exaggeration of the economic, political and military potential of the fascist empire, they underestimated the power of the USSR, the combat capability and morale of its people.

Hitler's “machine” was gaining momentum for victory, which seemed very easy and close to the leaders from the Reich. That is why the fighting had to be a blitzkrieg, and the offensive was a continuous advance deep into the USSR, and at very high speed. Short breaks were provided only to tighten up the rear.

Moreover, the Barbarossa plan completely excluded any delays due to resistance from the Soviet Army. The reason for the failure of this seemingly victorious plan was excessive confidence in one’s own strength, which, as history has shown, destroyed the plans of the fascist generals.

Chapter 23

However, Hitler kept his decision to attack the USSR strictly secret, leading the military to believe that England remained his main target. On the day Molotov arrived in Berlin, the Fuhrer outlined a new strategy. Having canceled the crossing of the English Channel, he decided to capture Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, Madeira and part of Morocco, which was supposed to cut off the British Isles from the rest of the empire and force it to capitulate.

It was a strategically precise plan, but unrealistic because it involved military cooperation with hesitant allies. No one understood the difficulties of this complex operation better than its author himself, but, despite recent setbacks, he was confident in his ability to cope with Petain, Mussolini and Franco. The Führer started with the caudillo and on November 18 informed his minister Serrano Suñer: “I have decided to attack Gibraltar. All we need is a signal to start the operation.”

Convinced that Franco would eventually enter the war, the Führer held a meeting in early December to seize Gibraltar. He informed the generals that he would receive Franco's consent in the near future, and then sent his personal representative to him. But the Fuhrer's choice turned out to be disastrous: it was Admiral Canaris, who had been working against Hitler since 1938. He laid out Hitler's official arguments to Franco and then informally advised him not to get involved in a war that the Axis would inevitably lose.

Canaris reported that Franco would enter the war “when England is on the verge of collapse.” Hitler lost patience and on December 10 ordered the cancellation of Operation Felix, the code name given to the plan to capture Gibraltar. But a few weeks later, the Fuhrer sent a lengthy message to Franco, in which he promised to immediately deliver the promised grain to Spain if the caudillo agreed to participate in the attack on Gibraltar. In his response, Franco did not skimp on promises, but did practically nothing to implement them. This led to the failure of Operation Felix. If Gibraltar had fallen, it is possible that all of North Africa and the Middle East would have been taken over by Hitler. The Arab world would enthusiastically support German expansion due to its hatred of the Jews. In addition to the difficult economic situation of Spain and the fear of being a loser, Franco also had a personal motive that prompted him to abandon the alliance with Hitler: the caudillo had an admixture of Jewish blood in his veins.

Stalin hesitated for almost two weeks before informing the Germans that he was ready to join Hitler's proposed quadripartite pact, but under certain conditions, one of which was the withdrawal of German troops from Finland. The demands did not seem excessive, but, to the surprise of the Foreign Ministry, Hitler did not even want to discuss them and, moreover, did not bother to answer Moscow.

The Führer set his sights on war, and at the end of November his generals began a series of staff exercises related to an attack on Russia. On December 5, the chiefs of staff of the three army groups participating in these exercises met with Hitler, Brauchitsch and Halder. Having approved in principle the plan of operation proposed by Halder, the Fuhrer noted, however, that one should not imitate Napoleon and consider Moscow as the main goal. Taking the capital, he said, “is not that important for us.” Brauchitsch countered that Moscow was of great importance not only as the center of the Soviet communications network, but also as a center of military industry. To this Hitler replied irritably: “Only completely ossified brains, brought up on the ideas of past centuries, think of nothing other than the capture of the capital.” He was more interested in Leningrad and Stalingrad, these hotbeds of Bolshevism. After their destruction, Bolshevism will be dead, and this is the main goal of the upcoming campaign. “Dominion over Europe,” Hitler continued, “will be achieved in the battle with Russia.”

Five days later, Hitler began preparing his people for a crusade. He gave a passionate speech in Berlin about the injustice in the distribution of natural resources. “Is this fair,” he asked, addressing the audience, “when 150 Germans live on one square kilometer? We must solve these problems, and we will solve them."

At the same time, Goebbels was preparing Germany for new challenges. Speaking to his employees, he said that the upcoming Christmas holidays should be limited to two days and should be celebrated modestly, in accordance with the requirements of the current moment and the fighting spirit of the German people.

On December 17, Hitler was presented with a plan for an attack on Russia developed by the General Staff. The Fuhrer made some changes to it, which provided for a delay in the attack on Moscow until the Baltic states were cleared and Leningrad was taken. The Fuhrer also gave the upcoming operation, which was previously called "Otto", a new name - "Barbarossa" ("Red Beard"). This was the name of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, who in 1190 began a crusade to the East. The main forces of the Red Army, concentrated on the western border, the Fuhrer indicated, “will be destroyed as a result of crushing blows from deeply penetrating tank wedges.” The troops that have retained their combat capability will be surrounded so that they will not be able to retreat into the interior of the country. “The final goal of the operation is to erect a barrier against the Asian part of Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. The last stronghold of the USSR in the Urals can then, if necessary, be eliminated by aviation.”

Halder believed that Hitler was bluffing and asked Engel how serious this plan was. The Fuhrer's adjutant replied that Hitler himself was apparently not yet confident in the accuracy of his forecasts. But the die was cast. Hitler did not tolerate those who called for moderation. Most of Europe was under German rule, they argued, and if they waited a little, England would recognize German hegemony. But for Adolf Hitler such a passive policy was unacceptable. The goal of National Socialism was the destruction of Bolshevism. Could he, the chosen one of fate, change his great mission?

The original plan "Barbarossa"

Outwardly, nothing marred the relationship between the two rival allies. Shortly after the approval of the Barbarossa plan, on January 10, 1941, Hitler approved two agreements with Moscow: one economic - on mutual supplies of goods, the other - a secret protocol, according to which Germany renounced its claims to a strip of Lithuanian territory for $ 7.5 million gold.

However, behind the facade of friendship, discord between the allies intensified. Raw materials from the Soviet Union arrived in Germany strictly on schedule, and German deliveries were constantly disrupted. There were cases when machines for Russia were already ready, but some inspector from the military department appeared, praised the product and then, “for reasons of defense,” took the machines away. This practice also extended to ships. Hitler himself ordered the suspension of work on the heavy cruiser intended for the Soviets: Germany needed to speed up the production of submarines. The Germans offered to tow the ship's hull to Leningrad and arm it with 380 mm Krupp guns, but the parties disagreed on the price, and the ship remained in Wilhelmshaven.

While Stalin sought peace, at least until the Red Army was brought to a combat-ready level, Hitler continued to prepare his people for war. Ominous was his speech on January 30 at the Sports Palace: “I am convinced that 1941 will be the beginning of a great new order in Europe.” But he named only England as the enemy, the leader of the “plutodemocracies”, which, Hitler claimed, were under the control of the international Jewish clique. Anti-British attacks served as cover for plans to attack the Soviet Union.

Four days later, after listening to Halder’s message that the number of German troops would soon equal the Russians, and they would surpass any enemy in terms of equipment, Hitler exclaimed: “When Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath!” The Fuhrer's appetites extended beyond the continent, and on February 17 he ordered the preparation of a plan for an invasion of the heart of the British Empire - India. Then the conquest of the Middle East was to follow by an enveloping maneuver: on the left - from Russia through Iran and on the right - from North Africa to the Suez Canal. Although these grandiose plans were primarily aimed at forcing England to yield to Germany, they indicated that Hitler had lost his sense of reality. In his imagination, Russia had already been conquered, and he was looking for new worlds to conquer, new enemies who had to be brought to their knees.

The defeat of Italian troops in Albania and Greece, according to Hitler, "dealt a blow to the belief in our invincibility among both friends and enemies." And therefore, before launching Operation Barbarossa, it was necessary to crush Greece and restore order in the Balkans. Hitler believed that the defeat of the Italians in the Balkans cleared the way for him to conquer new territories and acquire economic benefits.

Hitler's task was complicated by geographical conditions. Between Germany and Greece lay four countries - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The first two, which became German satellites, had had German troops for several months. The third, under strong pressure, joined the tripartite pact on March 1. Although this opened a direct route to Greece for German troops, Hitler was not left alone by the strategically important Yugoslavia. Its leaders did not want either a German or Russian military presence in the Balkans, and after hidden threats and vague promises failed to achieve the accession of the recalcitrant Yugoslavs to the Axis, Hitler invited the head of state, Prince Paul, to the Berghof.

Although the Yugoslav regent was enticed by Hitler's promise to guarantee the country's territorial integrity, he said that the decision to join the Axis presented a personal difficulty for him: his wife was Greek and sympathetic to England, and he had a deep dislike for Mussolini. The prince left without giving an answer, but three days later - an infinitely long period for Hitler - he announced Yugoslavia's readiness to join the tripartite pact, provided that he received the right to refrain from providing military assistance to anyone and would not be obliged to allow German troops through through the territory of your country. With difficulty containing his irritation, Hitler announced that he accepted the conditions. This conciliatory gesture unexpectedly encountered a decisive rebuff: the Yugoslavs declared their reluctance to take any actions that could involve them in war. But on March 17, the situation in Yugoslavia suddenly changed. The Royal Council agreed to join the tripartite pact. This caused a storm of protest, and after the resignation of three ministers, senior air force officers mutinied. On March 27, the rebels overthrew the government, and the young heir to the throne, Peter, was proclaimed king.

In Berlin that morning, Hitler was congratulating himself on the successful conclusion of the Yugoslav episode: he had just received a message that the local population “generally approved” of Yugoslavia joining the pact and that the government was “completely in control of the situation.” At five minutes to twelve, when the Fuhrer was preparing to receive Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, a new telegram arrived from Belgrade: former members of the Yugoslav government had been arrested. At first the Fuhrer thought it was a joke. But then he was overcome with indignation. The thought of having his victory taken away from him at the last moment was unbearable. He felt he had been personally insulted. Hitler demanded to immediately call Ribbentrop, who at that time was talking with Matsuoka, burst into the meeting room where Keitel and Jodl were waiting for a reception, and, waving a telegram, shouted that he would destroy Yugoslavia once and for all. The Fuhrer vowed that he would order troops to immediately invade Yugoslavia. Keitel objected that such an operation was now hardly possible: the start date of Barbarossa was close, the transfer of troops to the east was taking place in accordance with the maximum capacity of the railways. In addition, List's army in Bulgaria is too weak, and it is difficult to hope for help from the Hungarians.

“That’s why I called Brauchitsch and Halder,” Hitler replied irritably. “They must find some solution.” Now I intend to cleanse the Balkans."

Soon Brauchitsch, Halder, Goering, Ribbetrop and their adjutants arrived. Hitler sharply declared that he would destroy Yugoslavia as a state. To Ribbentrop's remark that perhaps it would be better to first send an ultimatum to the Yugoslavs, Hitler responded in an icy tone: “Is that how you assess the situation? Yes, the Yugoslavs will swear that black is white. Of course they say they have no aggressive intentions, and when we enter Greece they will stab us in the back.” The attack, he exclaimed, would begin immediately. The blow to Yugoslavia must be dealt ruthlessly, in the style of a blitzkrieg. This will scare the Turks and Greeks. The Fuhrer instructed Goering to destroy Yugoslav aviation at airfields, and then bomb their capital in “wave raids.” The Hungarian and Bulgarian envoys were urgently summoned. Hitler promised the first that if Hungary helps him resolve the Yugoslav issue, it will receive the disputed territories claimed by its Romanian neighbors. The Fuhrer promised Macedonia to the second.

Having ordered the attack and gained two allies, Hitler finally found time to receive the Japanese minister. The Fuhrer expressed the hope that America could be kept from entering the war, and this would best be done by Japan's capture of Singapore. Such a chance, Hitler concluded, may not present itself in the future. Japan, he added, had no need to fear that the Red Army would invade Manchuria: it was opposed by the might of the German army.

After a meeting with the Japanese minister, Hitler signed a directive on a simultaneous attack on Yugoslavia and Greece and at midnight began to prepare a message to Mussolini. The Fuhrer informed him that he had taken all necessary measures to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Hitler advised the Duce not to carry out further operations in Albania in the coming days, warning him against new adventures.

By this time, the nature of the relationship between the two dictators had changed. After the unsuccessful actions in Greece and Africa, Mussolini was no longer the "senior partner". In the eyes of the Fuhrer, he was simply a loser. The defeat of the Italians in Greece not only inspired the British to launch a successful offensive in Libya and discouraged Franco from supporting the operation to capture Gibraltar, but also forced Germany to deal with unruly Yugoslavia at the most inopportune moment for this. Operation Barbarossa had to be postponed for at least a month.

Although Hitler attributed the delay to Barbarossa to the campaign in Yugoslavia, the decisive factor was apparently the lack of weapons for the Wehrmacht. The Fuhrer was constantly haunted by the obsessive thought that the Russians might attack first. But when the commanders involved in Barbarossa were invited to the Reich Chancellery on March 30, he seemed calm. America, the Fuhrer reasoned, would reach the peak of military power no sooner than in four years. During this time, Europe must be cleansed. War with Russia is inevitable, and inaction would be catastrophic. The fighting is due to begin on June 22.

It was impossible to delay, Hitler continued, since none of his successors had sufficient authority to take responsibility for this operation. He alone can stop the Bolshevik skating rink before it spreads across Europe. Hitler called for the destruction of the Bolshevik state and the Red Army, assuring listeners that victory would be quick and effective. The only problem, he added ominously, was the way prisoners of war and civilians were treated.

The military listened to the Fuhrer in suspense. They were offended by Hitler's brutal methods after the conquest of Poland against Polish Jews, intelligentsia, clergy and aristocracy. And the Fuhrer continued: “The war against Russia is a struggle of ideologies and racial differences, and it will have to be waged with unprecedented, ruthless and unyielding cruelty.” There were no protests.

Meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece were completed. Patriotic demonstrations took place daily in Belgrade, some of them inspired by pro-Soviet local communists. Russia did seek to support the Yugoslavs in the face of the threat of a German invasion and signed a treaty with the new government on April 5. However, this did not bother Hitler. The next morning, a significant force of German troops crossed the Yugoslav border. During the operation, which the Fuhrer gave the meaningful name “Punishment,” the bombers began to methodically destroy Belgrade. The Soviet leaders, having just signed a treaty with Yugoslavia, reacted with surprising indifference, placing the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on the back page of Pravda. Only passing mention was made of the devastating air raids on Belgrade, which continued around the clock.

Hitler warned Goebbels that the entire campaign would last a maximum of two months, and this information was published. However, a week later, German and Hungarian troops entered the destroyed Belgrade. 17 thousand civilians died. On April 17, the remnants of the Yugoslav army capitulated. Ten days later, when German tanks entered Athens, the campaign in Greece was effectively over. 29 German divisions were transferred to combat zones with enormous expenditures of energy, fuel and time. Of these divisions, only ten took part in hostilities for six days.

The costs of the operation in the Balkans were mitigated by unexpected developments in North Africa. With only three divisions, General Erwin Rommel marched across the desert almost to the Egyptian border. This victory was no less a surprise for Hitler than for the enemy. England was losing control of the eastern Mediterranean. This damaged British prestige and convinced Stalin of the need to maintain previous relations with the Germans, despite their constant provocations. The Soviet leader stubbornly ignored the growing rumors about Hitler's plans to attack his country. Warnings came from numerous sources, including the US State Department. Foreign diplomats in Moscow spoke openly about the upcoming battle.

In recent months, Soviet intelligence also repeatedly warned its leadership about an impending attack on the USSR. But Stalin did not trust anyone. Convinced that Hitler was not so stupid as to attack Russia before neutralizing England, he believed that these were rumors fabricated by the capitalist West, which was seeking to provoke a war between him and Hitler. On one such warning from a Czech agent, he wrote in red pencil: “This is an English provocation. Find where the message came from and punish the culprit.”

Stalin sought to pacify Japan. As an honored guest, he received Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who had just visited Berlin, and did not hide his joy when the neutrality treaty was signed. At a banquet in the Kremlin on the day Belgrade fell, Stalin brought plates of treats to the Japanese guests, hugged and kissed them, and even danced. The treaty was a victory for USSR diplomacy, convincing proof that rumors of a German attack on Russia should be ignored. Of course, the Soviet leader reasoned, Hitler would never have allowed Japan to conclude this treaty if he was going to attack Russia...

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka signs a Neutrality Pact with the USSR. Behind are Molotov and Stalin

The tipsy Stalin was in such high spirits that he even went to the station to see off the Japanese delegation. He kissed General Nagai, then squeezed little Matsuoka in a bear hug, kissed him and said: “Now that there is a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Europe has nothing to fear.”

When the train with the Japanese started moving, he grabbed the German ambassador von Schulenburg with his hand and said: “We must remain friends, and you must do everything for this.”

Meanwhile, German planes committed numerous border violations while flying over the western regions of the USSR. In the last two weeks alone, the number of such violations reached 50. Soon, on Soviet territory, almost 150 kilometers from the border, a German plane made an emergency landing, on board which was a camera, undeveloped rolls of film and a map of this region of the USSR. Moscow sent a formal protest to Berlin, complaining that there had been 80 other violations of Soviet airspace since the end of March. But the protest was drawn up in a rather mild form, and Stalin continued to stubbornly ignore a new stream of warnings, including from the British Ambassador Cripps, who predicted that Hitler would attack the USSR on June 22.

Although everyone in the German Foreign Office suspected that the day of attack on Russia was near, it was not until mid-April that Hitler initiated Ribbentrop into Plan Barbarossa. The dejected minister wanted to make another diplomatic move in Moscow, but Hitler forbade him to do so. And the Fuhrer assured Schulenburg: “I am not planning a war with Russia.”

There is no doubt that Germany was facing the strongest military force in the world without reliable allies. Japan was on the other side of the continent. Italy was more of a burden than a helper, Spain avoided any specific obligations, and the Vichy government of France behaved the same way. Hitler's conquests frightened all his friends, including small countries such as Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. Its only strength lay in the Wehrmacht, and relying only on force destroyed more than one conqueror.

Hitler's only chance to win the war in the East could be an alliance with millions of potential opponents of the Stalinist regime. This is exactly what Rosenberg called for, but the Fuhrer ignored his arguments. This had fatal consequences for the Nazi dictator.

Hess's flight to England

Although at first the Wehrmacht leaders rejected the very idea of ​​​​an attack on Russia, they now almost unanimously shared the Fuhrer's confidence in a quick victory. The general consensus was that the campaign would be successfully completed within three months, and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch predicted that the major battles would end in four weeks and the war would become a local battle with "little resistance." The hard-nosed Yodel interrupted Warlimont, who questioned his categorical statement that “the Russian colossus will turn out to be a pig’s bladder: pierce it and it will squirt.”

According to General Guderian, the Fuhrer managed to infect his immediate military circle with unfounded optimism. The command was confident that the campaign would end before the onset of winter. Only every fifth soldier had warm uniforms. There were, of course, many skeptics in high circles. From the very beginning, Ribbentrop and Admiral Raeder spoke out against the Barbarossa plan. Keitel also had serious doubts, but he kept them to himself. There was opposition also in Hitler’s “family circle”.

Rudolf Hess, the Fuhrer's second successor after Goering, fully approved of the theory of expanding the "living space", but he was against an attack on Russia while the war with England continued. He believed that only the Bolsheviks would benefit from this conflict. Having met with geopolitician Professor Karl Haushofer, Hess was inspired by the idea of ​​a secret meeting with some influential Englishman in a neutral city. This, according to Haushofer, could contribute to the conclusion of peace with England.

Excited by the prospect of a secret mission, Hess outlined the plan to Hitler in the hope that it would restore his shaky position in the Nazi hierarchy. Hitler reluctantly agreed to Hess's proposal to talk on this topic with Professor Haushofer's eldest son Albrecht, who worked in the Foreign Ministry.

The young Haushofer, for a number of years a member of the secret anti-Hitler group, told Hess that perhaps it would be best to arrange a meeting with his good English friend the Duke of Hamilton, who had close ties to Churchill and the king. Hess left inspired, but Albrecht wrote to his father that “this business is a stupid idea.”

At the same time, as a German patriot, he decided to do everything he could and wrote a letter to Hamilton with a proposal to organize a meeting with Hess in Lisbon. He signed “A” and sent a letter to a certain Mrs. Roberta in Lisbon, who forwarded it to England, but the letter was intercepted by the English censor and handed over to intelligence. Time passed, no answer was received, and Hess decided to act independently, without the knowledge of the Haushofers and Hitler. He decided that he would fly to the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, jump out by parachute and negotiate under an assumed name. He was an experienced pilot who flew on the fronts of the First World War, the winner of the dangerous 1934 competition to fly around Germany's highest peak, Zugspitze. A solo flight through enemy territory into a remote corner of Scotland, he thought, would certainly impress young Hamilton, the same adventurous sports aviator who was the first to climb the world's highest peak, Everest. “I was faced with a very difficult decision,” Hess later admitted during interrogation. “I don’t think I would have dared to do this if I hadn’t seen the picture of an endless row of children’s coffins and crying mothers.” Hess was convinced that only in such an original way could he realize the Fuhrer's dream of a coalition between Germany and England. If this fails, he will not drag Hitler into the dubious business, and if he succeeds, then all the credit will be attributed to the Fuhrer. He was aware that the chances of success were low, but the game was worth the candle.

Karl Haushofer (left) and Rudolf Hess

Hess was sure that Hitler would approve of such a unique attempt to resolve the conflict, but would never allow him to take such risks. Therefore, it was very important to maintain secrecy. So thought the naive, not very smart Nazi, who, according to Adjutant Wiedemann, was Hitler’s “most devoted follower.”

Hess carefully prepared for the implementation of his plan. He persuaded aircraft designer Willy Messerschmitt to give him one. time two-seat fighter "Me-110". But this plane had a short range. According to Hess’s wishes, one additional gas tank with a volume of 100 liters was installed on each wing. Then he asked the designer to install a special radio station. After making twenty test flights, Hess decided that he had mastered the converted aircraft. In violation of wartime regulations, he purchased a new leather jacket and persuaded the Fuhrer Baur's personal pilot to give him a secret map of restricted air zones.

It is quite possible, he later wrote to his wife from prison, “I am not entirely normal. The flight and its purpose gripped me like an obsession. Everything else faded into the background."

Early in the morning of May 10, after listening to the weather forecast, which turned out to be favorable, Hess began to prepare for the flight. Never before had he been so affectionate with his wife. After breakfast he kissed her hand and stood at the door of the nursery with a thoughtful expression on his face. The wife asked when to expect him, assuming that the husband was flying to meet someone like Petain. “Monday at the latest,” was the answer.

The wife expressed doubt: “I don’t believe it. You won’t be back so soon.” Hess thought that she obviously guessed everything, looked at his sleeping son for the last time and left.

At 18.00, having handed over a letter to the adjutant for the Fuhrer, he took off from the airfield in Augsburg and headed for the North Sea. England was covered in haze. Disguising himself, Hess went down sharply, not knowing that a Spitfire was hanging on his tail. But the advantage in speed helped - the English fighter fell behind. Hess flew very low above the ground at speeds of up to 700 kilometers per hour, almost hitting trees and houses. A mountain appeared ahead. This was his reference point. At about 11:00 p.m. the pilot turned east and saw the railroad tracks and a small lake, which, as he remembered, was supposed to be just south of the Duke's estate. Having risen to a height of 1800 meters, Hess turned off the engine and opened the cabin. He suddenly remembered that he had never jumped with a parachute, believing that it was easy. When the fighter began to lose altitude, Hess remembered the words of one friend that it is best to jump when the plane is upside down. He turned the car over. The pilot was pinned to the seat and began to lose consciousness. With his last effort he pushed himself out of the cabin, pulled the parachute ring and, to his surprise, slowly began to fall down.

Upon impact with the ground, Hess lost consciousness. He was discovered by a farmer and taken to the militia, who took the captured pilot to Glasgow. Calling himself First Lieutenant Alfred Horne, he asked to see the Duke of Hamilton.

His letter was delivered to Hitler at the Berghof on the morning of Sunday 11 May. During Engel's report, Martin Bormann's brother Albert came in and said that Hess's adjutant wanted to see the Fuhrer on a very urgent matter. “Don’t you see that I’m busy? I’m listening to a military report!” Hitler flared up. But a minute later Albert appeared again, saying that the matter was very serious, and gave Hitler a letter from Hess. He put on his glasses and began to read indifferently, but the very first line stunned him: “My Fuhrer, when you receive this letter, I will be in England.” Hitler fell into his chair shouting: “Oh God, oh God! He flew to England! Hess's goal, Hitler read, was to help the Fuhrer achieve an alliance with England, but he kept the flight secret because he knew that the Fuhrer would not agree to it. “And if, my Fuhrer, this project, which I admit has little chance of success, ends in failure and fate turns away from me, it will not have disastrous consequences for you or Germany; You can always disclaim any liability. Just tell me I'm crazy."

The Fuhrer, white as chalk, ordered him to be connected with the Reichsmarshal. “Goering, come here immediately!” he shouted into the phone. Then he ordered Albert to find and call his brother and Ribbentrop. He immediately ordered the arrest of the unfortunate adjutant Hess and began excitedly pacing around the room. When Martin Bormann ran in out of breath, Hitler demanded to know whether Hess could fly to England on the Me-110. The answer to this question was given by the famous First World War ace, Luftwaffe General Udet. “Never!” he exclaimed. “I hope he fell into the sea,” muttered the Fuhrer.

Hitler's anger intensified. How to present this story to the world? What if the Japanese and Italians suspect that Germany is plotting a separate peace? Will this message affect the morale of the soldiers? Worst of all, did Hess give away the Barbarossa plan? After considering various versions, a press release was finally compiled stating that Hess had taken off without permission and disappeared. It is believed that he crashed. It was also stated that the letter he left “unfortunately shows signs of mental disorder and raises concerns that Hess was the victim of hallucinations.”

Frau Hess was watching a movie when she was called out of the audience. Upon learning that a message was broadcast on the radio about the death of her husband, she angrily replied: “Nonsense!” - and called the Berghof, hoping to talk to the Fuhrer. Borman answered her and said that he had absolutely no information on this issue. Knowing her husband's assistant well, she did not believe him. Then she called her husband’s brother Alfred Hess in Berlin - he also did not believe that Rudolf was dead.

There were no reports from England, although Hess, who confessed his true identity, told the Duke of Hamilton about his peacekeeping mission and how he and Albrecht Haushofer tried to arrange a meeting in Lisbon. Hamilton hurried to Churchill, but he said: “Well, Hess or not Hess, I’m going to watch a film with the Marx brothers.” (The Marx Brothers were popular comic actors in American cinema at the time).

A few hours after the German report of Hess's disappearance, the British finally reported his arrival in England. No details were provided. But this news forced the Germans to clarify the official version of the incredible act of Hitler’s closest associate.

On May 13, a communiqué was published acknowledging the fact of Hess’s flight to England. It continued: “As was well known in party circles, Hess had been suffering from serious physical illness for a number of years. Lately he has been seeking relief through various methods practiced by psychics, astrologers, etc. Measures are being taken to establish the extent to which these individuals are responsible for creating the conditions for the mental disorder that prompted him to take such a rash step.”

This version caused general bewilderment. Goebbels told his staff: “Currently our business is to keep our mouths shut, not to explain anything to anyone, not to enter into polemics with anyone. This matter will become clear during the day, and I will give appropriate instructions.” He tried to reassure his subordinates that Hess's flight would be regarded as a minor episode in the future.

At an emergency meeting of the Gauleiter and Reichsleiter, Hitler said that Hess’s flight was pure madness: “Hess is first and foremost a deserter, and if I get him, he will pay for it like an ordinary traitor. It seems to me that the astrologers whom Hess gathered around him pushed him to this step. So it’s time to put an end to these stargazers.” Listeners knew of Hess's interest in homeopathic medicine and astrology and were prepared to believe in his mental disorder. However, they wondered: why did Hitler keep him in such a high position for so long?

At the meeting, the Fuhrer did not say a word about the upcoming attack on Russia and his fear that Hess had revealed this secret to the British. He needn't have worried. During interrogation, Hess argued that there was “no basis for rumors that Hitler was going to attack Russia.” He wanted to talk about peace with England. He arrived without Hitler's consent to "convince the responsible people: the most reasonable course would be to conclude peace."

As soon as Albrecht Haushofer learned about Hess's flight to England, he hurried to his father. “And with such fools we make politics!” he exclaimed. The father sadly agreed that "this terrible sacrifice was made in vain." Young Haushofer was summoned to the Berghof, taken into custody and ordered to write a message for the Führer, who refused to accept it. He wrote everything he knew, but did not mention his friends in the anti-Hitler group. Albrecht Haushofer spoke about his connections with the Duke of Hamilton, about the letter he wrote at the request of Hess, adding that he himself would be very useful for further contacts with the British. After reading the paper, Hitler decided not to rush. He ordered Haushofer to be handed over to the Gestapo for further interrogation. The Fuhrer spared the father of the criminal, angrily saying about him: “Hess is on the conscience of this professor associated with Jews.”

Other people from Hess's entourage were also arrested - his brother Alfred, adjutants, orderlies, secretaries and drivers. Ilsa Hess remained free, but Martin Bormann tried his best to humiliate her. Having become Hess' successor, he did everything to erase his memory: all photographs of Hess and literature with his photographs were destroyed. He even tried to confiscate Hess's house, but Hitler did not sign this order.

The British government decided not to publish the materials of Hess's interrogation in order to confuse the Germans. On the night of May 16, he was secretly transported to the Tower of London, where he remained a prisoner of war until the end of the war.

Hess's flight greatly alarmed Stalin, who, in light of rumors of an impending attack on the USSR by unreliable allies, suspected that the British had entered into a conspiracy with Hitler.

No matter how upset and angry Hitler was, he once admitted in a small circle that he respected Hess for such self-sacrifice. Hitler did not believe that Hess was crazy, he believed that he was simply not smart enough and did not realize the catastrophic consequences of his mistake.

From the Tower, Hess wrote to his wife that he did not regret his action: “It’s true, I achieved nothing. I couldn't stop this crazy war. I couldn't save people, but I'm happy I tried."

On May 12, Hitler issued two repressive orders. One declared that Russian civilians who used weapons against the Wehrmacht in the coming war should be shot without trial. Another authorized Himmler to carry out “special tasks arising from the struggle between two opposing political systems.” The SS chief was to act independently of the Wehrmacht “on his own responsibility.” No one had the right to interfere with his activities in the occupied Russian territory, which must be “cleansed” of Jews and troublemakers by special SS units “Einsatzgruppen” (“special forces”).

Both directives worried Alfred Rosenberg, who had recently been appointed "Reich Commissioner for the Control of Eastern European Territories." Coming from the Baltic states, he believed that Soviet people should be treated with loyalty. He assured Hitler that the population would greet the Germans as liberators from Bolshevik-Stalinist tyranny, and self-government could be allowed within certain limits in the occupied territories of the former USSR. Moreover, each region requires a selective approach. For example, Ukraine could be “an independent state in alliance with Germany,” but the Caucasus should be governed by a German “plenipotentiary.”

Convinced that hardline policies in the East would interfere with the development of Lebensraum, Rosenberg submitted a memorandum to Hitler objecting to both directives. How could a civil administration be established in occupied territories, he argued, without the use of the Soviet commissars and officials currently administering them? Rosenberg recommended that only high-ranking figures be “liquidated.” Hitler did not give a definite answer. He was used to the fact that Rosenberg competed with Himmler in the struggle for influence over the Fuhrer.

Meanwhile, final preparations for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa continued. On May 22, Raeder informed Hitler that he was stopping supplies of strategic materials to Russia, although supplies from the East were coming regularly. In addition to 1,500,000 tons of grain, the Soviet Union supplied Germany with 100,000 tons of cotton, 2,000,000 tons of petroleum products, 1,500,000 tons of wood, 140,000 tons of manganese and 25,000 tons of chromium. Despite the suspicions caused by Hess's flight, Stalin tried so hard to appease Hitler that he ordered the green light for trains delivering important raw materials to Germany.

Von Schulenburg's meeting with Molotov that same day convinced the German ambassador that the recent concentration of power in Stalin's hands had strengthened his control over Soviet foreign policy. In the hope of preventing the implementation of Barbarossa, Schulenburg reported to Berlin that in recent weeks the USSR's attitude towards Germany had noticeably improved. And on May 30, three days after the capture of the strategically important island of Crete by German paratroopers, Admiral Raeder tried to divert Hitler's attention from the East, advising him to organize a major offensive on Egypt with the aim of capturing the Suez Canal. Now, he argued, was the right moment to strike. After receiving reinforcements, General Rommel can win a decisive victory. But nothing could stop Hitler: the Barbarossa plan was put into action. Meeting with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on June 2, Hitler talked about everything - about the submarine war against England, about Hesse and the situation in the Balkans. But he didn’t say a word about Barbarossa. And not only for reasons of secrecy: the Duce warned him in no uncertain terms against attacking Russia.

Roads and railways operated at full capacity. On June 6, Hitler summoned the Japanese Ambassador Oshima to the Berghof and informed him that, due to Soviet border violations, a significant number of troops were being transferred to the East. “Under such circumstances, war between us may be inevitable,” he said confidently. For Oshima, this meant a declaration of war, and he immediately warned Tokyo that an attack on Russia would soon occur.

On June 14, Soviet agent Sorge sent a warning from Tokyo: “The war will begin on June 22.” But Stalin continued to stubbornly ignore the alarming messages. He convinced himself that the war could not begin before 1942, and on the same day he ordered the publication of a TASS message refuting numerous rumors about the war. This authoritative message calmed the army.

On June 17, the “Z” hour was approved - 3 a.m. on June 22. On this day, a German non-commissioned officer, who was threatened with execution for a fight with an officer, ran over to the Russians. He announced that the German offensive would begin at dawn on June 22. This alarmed the military, but they were reassured: “There is no need to panic.”

In London, Ambassador Cripps, who arrived from Moscow for consultations, issued another warning about the impending attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. “We have reliable information that it will take place tomorrow, June 22, or at the latest June 29,” he told Soviet Ambassador Maisky. He sent an urgent encryption to Moscow.

Finally, Stalin authorized putting the troops on combat readiness. He also instructed his ambassador in Berlin to deliver a note to Ribbentrop strongly protesting the 180 violations of Soviet airspace by German aircraft, which had "assumed a systematic and deliberate character."

In the Reich Chancellery, Hitler was preparing a letter to Mussolini, trying to explain the reason for the attack on Russia. The Soviets had concentrated enormous numbers of troops along the Reich's borders, he argued, and time was on the enemy's side. “So after much agonizing thought, I finally made the decision to break the loop before it tightened.”

In Moscow, Molotov urgently summoned the German ambassador Schulenburg to give weight to the note of protest, which his ambassador in Berlin had not yet been able to deliver to Ribbentrop. “There are a number of signs,” he told Schulenburg, “that the German government is dissatisfied with our actions. There are even rumors that Germany and the Soviet Union are close to war.”

All Schulenburg could do was promise to convey the Soviet government's statement to Berlin. He returned to the embassy, ​​not knowing, like Molotov, that war would begin in a few hours.

The commanders read out Hitler's address to the troops. “Burdened with anxiety for many months, forced to remain silent, I can finally speak openly to you, my soldiers.” The Fuhrer claimed that the Russians were preparing to attack Germany and were guilty of numerous violations of its border. “German soldiers!” Hitler addressed them. “You have to fight a battle, a difficult and important battle. The fate of Europe and the future of the German Reich, the existence of our country are now only in your hands.” Along the entire winding front line, 1,500 kilometers long, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, three million people listened to the Fuhrer and believed him.

It was the shortest night of the year, the time of the summer solstice. But for those who waited for the pale dawn to rush into the offensive, it seemed endless. At midnight, the Moscow-Berlin express rumbled across the border bridge into German territory. He was followed by a long freight train loaded with grain - this was Stalin's last delivery to his ally Adolf Hitler.

There was an atmosphere of anticipation in Berlin that evening. Foreign journalists gathered in the foreign press lounge hoping to get information from a group of Foreign Office officials, but as no official word had been received by midnight, everyone began to go home. And in the Reich Chancellery there was such unusual activity that even Hitler’s press secretary Dietrich, who knew nothing about the Barbarossa plan, was sure that “some kind of grandiose action against Russia was being prepared.” Hitler had no doubt about success. “In three months at the latest,” he told the adjutant, “Russia will suffer such a collapse as the world has never seen before.” Nevertheless, that night he could not close his eyes.

At 3 a.m. on June 22, exactly one year after the French surrender at Compiègne, the German infantry moved forward. Fifteen minutes later, fires broke out along the entire front line. From the flashes of the guns, the pale night sky became as bright as day: Operation Barbarossa had begun.

Fifteen minutes before Z hour, the German ambassador to Italy, von Bismarck, handed Ciano a lengthy letter from Hitler. Ciano immediately called Mussolini. The Duce was angry both at being disturbed at such a late hour and at being informed so late. “I don’t even bother the servants at night,” he grumpily told his son-in-law, “but the Germans make me jump up at any time.”

In Moscow, Schulenburg went to the Kremlin to report that in response to the Soviet Union's intention to "stab Germany in the back," the Führer had ordered the Wehrmacht to "confront this threat with all means." Molotov listened silently to the German ambassador and said with bitterness in his voice: “This is war. Your planes just bombed about ten of our cities. Do you really think we deserve this?

In Berlin, Ribbentrop ordered the Soviet ambassador to be summoned at 4.00. Never before had translator Schmidt seen the Foreign Minister so excited. Walking around the room like a caged animal, Ribbentrop repeated: “The Fuhrer is absolutely right to attack Russia now.” He seemed to be convincing himself: “The Russians themselves would have attacked us if we had not gotten ahead of them.”

At exactly 4.00, the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov entered. Just as he began to outline Soviet grievances, Ribbentrop interrupted him, declaring that the hostile position of the USSR had forced the Reich to take military countermeasures. “I regret that I cannot say anything more,” Ribbentrop said. “Despite serious efforts, I have not been able to establish reasonable relations between our countries.”

Having mastered himself, Dekanozov expressed regret about what happened, placing responsibility for the consequences on the German side. He stood up, nodded casually and left without extending his hand to Ribbentrop.

Back in 1940, the Barbarossa plan was briefly developed and approved, according to which it was planned to establish complete total control over the Soviet Union, the only country that, according to Hitler, could resist Germany.

It was planned to do this in a very short time, striking in three directions with the joint efforts of Germany and its allies - Romania, Finland and Hungary. It was planned to attack in three directions:
in the southern direction - Ukraine was under attack;
in the northern direction - Leningrad and the Baltic states;
in the central direction - Moscow, Minsk.

Full coordination of the actions of the military leadership to seize the Union and establish complete control over it, and the end of preparations for military operations was supposed to be completed in April 1941. The German leadership mistakenly assumed that it would be able to complete the fleeting seizure of the Soviet Union, according to the Barbarossa plan, much earlier than the war with Great Britain was over.

The whole essence of Barbarossa's plan boiled down to the following.
The main forces of the ground forces of the Soviet Union, which were located in the western part of Russia, had to be completely destroyed with the help of tank wedges. The main goal of this destruction was to prevent the withdrawal of even part of the combat-ready troops. Next, it was necessary to occupy a line from which air raids could be carried out on the territory of the Reich. The final goal of the Barbarossa plan is a shield that could separate the European and Asian parts of Russia (Volga-Arkhangelsk). In this state of affairs, the Russians would only have industrial facilities left in the Urals, which could be destroyed, in case of urgent need, with the help of the Luftwaffe. When developing the Barbarossa plan, special attention was given to coordinating actions in such a way as to deprive the Baltic Fleet of any opportunity to participate in hostilities against Germany. And possible active attacks from the air forces of the Union were supposed to be prevented by preparing and implementing an operation to attack them. That is, reducing in advance the ability of the air force to effectively defend itself.

In coordinating the Barbarossa plan, Hitler considered it important that commanders bring to the attention of their subordinates that all measures taken in connection with the implementation of such a plan are considered exclusively preventive - so that the Russians would not be able to take a position other than the one assigned to them by the German leadership. Information about the development of this type of attack was kept secret. Only a small number of officers were allowed to plan military operations that were supposed to be carried out against the Soviet Union. This is due solely to the fact that an unwanted outflow of information will lead to dire political and military consequences.

Your work “plan of Barbarossa in brief” was sent by the customer sebastian1 for revision.

Plan Barbarossa is a program developed by Hitler for the conquest of the USSR.

It is considered the Fuhrer’s most important miscalculation, which four years after the start of the plan led Germany to defeat.

Prerequisites

From the moment they came to power in 1933, the Nazis promoted a policy of occupying the eastern territories. Such propaganda was very convenient: it allowed the Nazis to gain the support of the people, who were convinced that all of Germany's problems arose as a result of the loss in the First World War and the loss of territories.

Germany must regain its former power, the Nazis declared, and be reborn as a great empire. In turn, the promise of imperial greatness allowed the oligarchs, whose proteges were the Nazis, not to deal with the solution of social and economic problems in the country and to keep their capital for themselves.

The plan to attack the USSR was given the code name "Barbarossa" in honor of Frederick I Barbarossa, the 12th-century German ruler who also tried to revive the empire of Charlemagne. The authors of the concept seemed to hint that what Friedrich could not do to the end, Adolf Hitler would do. At the same time, the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union was also promoted.

In 1939, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR in order to protect itself from the east, and in September of the same year, both countries almost simultaneously attacked Poland: the USSR appropriated the eastern regions (Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), and the rest went to the Germans, establishing the Polish General Government.

Why was it necessary to attack the USSR?

In achieving world domination, Hitler's Germany had a serious rival - Great Britain. And she hoped for help from two other superpowers - the USSR and the USA. To overcome their main enemy, the Nazis developed a plan for a phased takeover of the world:

  • The defeat of the USSR will lead to the strengthening of the Nazi ally - Japan;
  • Japan, with German support, will defeat the United States.
  • Having lost both allies, England will leave Europe and Germany will remain dominant in it.

Before arriving at this plan, the Nazi government held a series of negotiations with several countries, including the Soviet Union. In 1940, the Berlin Pact was initiated to rally new allies around Germany against England. The USSR responded that it was ready to join the treaty only under a number of certain conditions, which the German side could not accept.

Thus, the USSR was declared a serious enemy of Germany and the “last frontier” on the Nazis’ path to domination in Europe.

Hit from multiple sides

The German government was confident that “Russia” (as they called the Soviet Union) could be conquered with one lightning attack. To do this, the attack had to be carried out from several sides:

  • North - from the Baltic side;
  • South - from the Ukrainian side;
  • Later, a separate operation was planned to attack Baku.

The Nazis set a tough task - to conquer the Soviet Union by the spring of 1941. Moscow was considered an important point - the largest and most developed city in the country, its capital and most important railway junction. The Nazi government believed that the Red Army would throw all its forces into defending Moscow, weakening other strategically important areas.

Plans were also prepared for the division of the USSR. The European part of the country was planned to be decentralized and divided into several economic zones, which were to become an agricultural and raw materials appendage of the Reich. Modern industrial equipment had to be taken to the Reich. In the future, these zones were planned to be reorganized into separate states controlled by Germany.

Hitler's Miscalculations

Barbarossa's plan was only good on paper. The Nazis underestimated the capabilities of Soviet defense and clearly overestimated their own strength. Instead of a lightning strike, they received a many-year protracted war, which ended with the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops and the fall of the fascist regime.

Meanwhile, at first this was not noticeable: Soviet troops suffered defeats in border battles, as well as at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, when Germany quite quickly conquered the territories of Ukraine and Belarus.

The defeats of the Soviet army were due to several reasons, including:

  • Massive Stalinist repressions, including against the high command;
  • The new commanders who took their posts in place of those repressed were not distinguished by their professionalism and proper training;
  • Insufficient interaction between different types of troops, their poor preparation for a major war;
  • The Soviet army leadership hoped for an offensive nature of the war and did not do enough defensive operations.